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Summary In the article will have been introduced possibilities following from the application of the microprocessor 
technology in rail systems of the control of traffic will remain for example of modern signalling on railway crossings. 
Introduction to microcomputer and microprocessor systems of rail devices will permit to eliminate and to replace disused 
relay devices with them and raising safety on railway and increasing reliability of used devices. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Since the beginning of existence of railway lines, 
devices allowing for safe control of traffic have been 
applied. Development of devices progresses 
continuously. Requirement pose them steady 
increasing as well as needs and expectation of their 
users. However the major purposes of applying these 
devices – the safety and efficiency of traffic, remain 
unchanged. New microprocessor systems meet these 
requirements.  
An application of modern information 
technology and  more effective microprocessor 
systems has a large influence on development of 
railway transport. They are deciding generally that 
computer technologies are determining the standard 
and trends of progress of the technique of the traffic 
control systems. 
2. TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF 
AUTOMATIC OF THE LEVEL CROSSING 
OF POLISH RAILWAY 
Systems of automatic of the level crossing being 
used in Polish railway lines are realized in different 
technologies. Systems of automatic of the level 
crossing can be divided with respect to technique of 
implementation of controlling function into three 
groups: relays, hybrid (electronic and relays) and 
microprocessors. About 27% of devices are devices 
being built on the basis of relays, 59% of devices are 
devices being built on the basis of hybrid technique 
and 14% of them are built on the basis of 
microprocessor.  
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Fig.1. Percentage division of crossing levels in Poland 
with respect fabricating technology 
 
Technology of systems of automatic of the level 
crossing should allow to introduce new elements 
during exploitation of systems without violations of 
determined system’s functions.  
In the group of devices being built on the basis of 
relays, two solutions can be distinguished: channel 
devices being built from relays of N class and 
channel  devices using magnetic and teletechnique 
relays. 
Systems being made in hybrid technology 
contained more and more digital circuits, and the 
number and the role of relays are diminished. 
Synchronizing functions were more and more 
sophisticated, and the need of synchronization of 
operation of controlling channels arose. 
The newest microprocessor systems (SPA-4, 
NE BUE 90E, BUES 2000, RASP-4) require 
application software adjusted to particular situation 
on railway crossing. An application of PLC 
controllers allowed for increasing controlling 
functions. Important innovation is recording the 
events occurring at the work of system of automatic 
of the level crossing. 
3. COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF AUTOMATIC 
OF THE LEVEL CROSSING  
As a rule, computer systems of railway traffic 
control should be executed as “fail-safe”, what 
means that a single damage (of equipment, software)  
or interference cannot cause a dangerous situation, 
assuming negligibly small probability of double 
(multiple) damage occurrence. Additionally, single  
errors  are  assumed to be detected in a relatively  
short time and the damage detected by an 
appropriate system’s response to the fact. The SIL 4 
(Safety Integrity Levels) included in the norms of 
the European Committee of Normalization in  
CENELEC Electrotechnics is another important 
criterion. SIL 4 is the highest safety level and 
determines the damage intensity (the probability of 
damage occurrence in a unit time) for a single 
system element 10E-11. 
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For computer systems of railway traffic control it 
is necessary to consider issues of  safety and 
reliability on two levels: 
− of technical devices, creating the infrastructure 
of railway traffic control system;  
− of system software.  
To meet the requirements of safety the system 
has to consist of two computers linked together in a 
suitable structure, which at least performs 
appropriate data processing and mutual check-up 
possible, etc. There are also other systems, based on 
one unit. For obtaining required conditions of safety 
the other computer is utilized as the hot reserve.  
Appropriate software operations are executed for 
the safety of single-channel systems. They are 
relying on  encoding and converting data through 
two programs in one unit which are testing each 
other. The best situation is when applications are 
written by different groups of programmers.  
Multi-channel systems, most often two-channel 
or three-channel, are named “2 out of 2” and “2 out 
of 3” respectively, which safety is ensured by 
redundancy of hardware and software. In solutions 
with two computers results are compared, and 
according to safe work condition of system “2 out of 
2” only full compatibility effects of all calculations 
are obtained on output of active channels. In the “2 
out of 3” system the negative result of compare 
makes switch to action/operate the third computer, 
which result of converting is taking under  
consideration alike previously on two computers 
(fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig.2. Save work of computer system “2 out of 3”  
(SELMIS) 
 
The redundancy of control programme is the 
most often encountered method of safety assurance 
in computer systems from the software point of 
view. A change to the emergency control 
programme of the control application is a method in 
case of damage detection (both methods are 
operating on the system level, they  respond to 
hardware and software errors themselves this way). 
4.  ANALYSIS OF SETUPS OF THE 
CONTROL OF THE LEVEL CROSSING 
MICROPROCESSOR SYSTEMS 
4.1. Level crossing system SPA-4 made by 
Bombardier ZWUS Katowice 
Automatic level crossing system SPA-4 is 
microprocessor’s system automatically protecting 
traffic on railway crossing. It is based on PLC 
controllers consisting solely of contact less elements. 
This system has two channels architecture, in which 
separable electrically controlling and supplying 
channels A and B execute independently operational 
algorithm (fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig.3. The Layout of devices of automatic of the level 
crossing SPA-4 type 
 
Level crossing system exploits MINICONTROL 
controllers manufactured by Bernecker & Rainer. 
Controlling system of SPA-4 consists of two 
identical controlling channels. Each channel consists 
of PLC controller, interfaces allowing receiving of 
input signals and amplifiers of output signals 
amplifying these signals to level required by output 
devices. Drivers are linked with the use of  a TTY 
interface, which also assures synchronization of two 
channels operation. Detection of the lack of 
parallelism is treated as a signalling failure. 
Control application originates from the activation 
of PROSYS system supplied by the manufacturer of 
drivers. The programme is executed in the sequential 
mode. The software was written on the level of 
processor 6303 assembler. In PLC drivers there is a 
possibility of automatic conversion from the level of 
the internal language to the level of logical 
diagrams. 
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4.2. Level crossing system NE BUE 90E 
Controlling system of NE BUE 90E is based on 
Siemens SIMATIC S5 PLC controllers (fig. 4). 
Controlling system consists of  two independent 
controlling  channels executing the same program. 
Each channel is fitted with CPU 103 microprocessor 
controller. The program is fetched from EPROM 
and copied to RAM memory. It prevents from  
memory errors and program interference. 
Controlling circuits are conjugated with the use 
of parallel interface using to send data. In care of 
error detection, difference in states and 
synchronization the proper loggers are sent.  
 
 
Fig.4. The view of controller SIMATIC S5 
4.3.  Level crossing system BUES 2000 made by 
Scheidt&Bachmann 
Steering of level crossing system is performed in 
two channel fashion. Each channel consists of  
central unit, lights and barrier module, railway 
module and diagnostic module. Each module has the 
own doubled processors, which processes 
independent fragments of program in real time. 
During start of system the program is loaded to the 
memory. Application of proper software allows for 
the safety increase. The device is resilient, it means, 
it accepts errors not having the influence on the 
realization of basis functions. 
In microprocessor’s level crossing system type 
BUES 2000 typical module processor’s have been 
applied. All processors are universal, each of them 
can realize functions of central units, railway, or 
lights. Sort of function being executed by processor 
depends on its placement in the system. Thanks to 
an application of components of diagnostic device 
complying with PC standard, it is possible to use  
software and operational systems available on the 
market. 
Such solution allows on  easy control of program 
executed in each module. Both of control channel 
realize the same program. 
 
 
Fig.5. View of modular processor (with display) 
using in management level 
 
4.4.  Level crossing system RASP-4 made by 
KOMBUD Radom 
Control of level crossing system is performed 
with the use of PLC controllers 90-30 manufactured 
by GE Fanuc. Controllers have central unit 
IC693CPU350. Their operation is based on 
information exchange and synchronization of the 
work through two channels of data bus.  
Both of channel being fitted with controllers 
collaborate with duplicated I-O blocks through two 
independently operating buses. Each bus is 
simultaneously connected to two controllers. 
Modules installed in two chests create two 
independently operating controllers with mutual 
exchanging of data and synchronizing of buses. 
Central units of both controllers operate 
synchronously and check mutually their presence. In 
concerns logic states elaborated in the ce (faults of 
sensors, drivers, supplying) and physic state 
generated from I-O blocks GENIUS determining 
incorrectness of their inputs or outputs. 
In Controllers of series 90-30, controlling 
program written by the user (used to control the 
process) are services by the special coprocessor.   
 
 
Fig.6. Modular construction of level crossing system 
type RASP-4 
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Remote control systems communicates with each 
level crossing system with the use of RS-232 and 
modems. Two pairs of wires of phone cable is used 
to communication. One pair serves to transmission 
of messages and second one to transmission of 
commands. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Among from all types of railway traffic control 
systems, systems of automatic of the level crossing 
degrade very vastly. It is caused by steady increasing 
traffic dense. Irrespective of  the type of system and 
exploitation time, the safety level has to be 
appropriately high.  
Introduction of microprocessors and 
microcontrollers to railway traffic control systems 
contributes to arise new generation systems, which 
ensure high efficiency and safety. Most of present 
controlling systems have been built basing on relays. 
Relay’s devices have numerous drawbacks such as 
large material consulting and power consumption. 
Due to there drawbacks. Recently, due to 
drawbacks, there devices are replaced by 
microprocessors devices.  
Bigger safety of the automatic systems of the 
level crossing results from the type of applications 
of modern technologies (of programmable drivers), 
is based on two control channels, diversity of 
applications in channel A and B, possibilities of 
immediate faults detection in devices and 
applications (self-testing), and also on the possibility 
to carry out monitoring of the system work by both 
registration of all events and of failures. 
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